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LITERAL AND PURPOSIVE 
TECHNIQUES OF LEGISLATIVE 
INTERPRETATION:  SOME EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY AND ENGLISH COMMON 
LAW PERSPECTIVES 
Ian McLeod∗ 
I.         INTRODUCTION:  A TALE OF TWO TRADITIONS 
he United Kingdom’s entry1 into the European Economic 
Community (as it then was)2 involved an intimate inter-
mingling of two of the world’s great legal traditions: the English 
legal system’s common law tradition3 and the Community legal 
system’s civil law (or Roman law based) tradition.  Among the 
more obvious differences between the two traditions are the 
English doctrines of the legislative supremacy of Parliament 
and binding precedent, neither of which has any counterpart 
within the civil law tradition.  Although the doctrinal con-
straints within which the English legal system functions have 
not, in practice, generally inhibited judicial creativity to any 
substantial extent, the United Kingdom’s entry into the Com-
munity did at least raise the perception of one particular area of 
difficulty, namely the difference between the English technique 
of literalism in the process of legislative interpretation and the 
civil law technique of purposive (or teleological, to use the civil 
law’s own terminology) interpretation. 
  
 ∗  LLB, BA, BPhil, Solicitor of the Supreme Court, England and Wales; 
Head of Division of Law, London Metropolitan University (UK).  This article 
is based on a paper given on September 19, 2003 at Brooklyn Law School as a 
contribution to a Symposium on the theme of Creating and Interpreting Law 
in a Multi-Lingual Environment.  
 1. Entry became effective on January 1, 1973. 
 2. In practice, the European Economic Community (“EEC”) came to be 
known simply as the European Community (“EC”), but this usage was not 
formalized until the Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty on European Union, or 
“TEU”).  The phrase Community law is to be preferred to the more commonly 
encountered Union law because the Community is still an essentially legal 
entity while the Union is a political entity.     
 3. The phrase English legal system is used here with its conventional 
meaning to describe the legal system of England and Wales. 
T
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Article I. Lord Denning MR4 gave voice to this perception 
when, having compared the detailed drafting of English legisla-
tion with the open-textured drafting of the Community Treaty, 
he said: 
Beyond doubt the English courts must follow the same princi-
ples [of interpretation] as the European court.  Otherwise 
there would be differences between the [member states].  That 
would never do.  All the courts of all [the member states] 
should interpret the [Treaty] in the same way.5 
The discussion contained within this Article will show that 
this perception of the extent of the distinction between English 
and Community techniques of interpretation was (at least in 
relation to the contemporary English practice of legislative in-
terpretation) a significant overstatement,6 before proceeding to 
compare the English version of purposivism with that employed 
by the European Court of Justice.7   
II.   LITERAL AND PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN ENGLISH LAW 
There can be no doubt that, in the Nineteenth Century, the 
English courts were strongly inclined towards a literal approach 
to legislative interpretation.  For example, in the Sussex Peer-
age Case,8 Lord Tindal CJ said:  
If the words of the statute are in themselves precise and un-
ambiguous, then no more can be necessary than to expound 
  
 4. The Master of the Rolls is the most senior judge of the Court of Appeal 
(Civil Division).  The Court of Appeal ranks between the High Court and the 
House of Lords.   In the overall order of judicial precedence, the Master of the 
Rolls ranks immediately below the Lord Chief Justice, who presides over the 
Court of Appeal (Criminal Division), and is the most senior member of the 
judiciary.  
 5. See HP Bulmer Ltd. v. J Bollinger SA [1974] 3 W.L.R. 202, 226 (Eng.).  
The same point was made by the European Court of Justice in Amministrazi-
one della Finanze del Stato v. Simmenthal SpA (“Rules of Community law 
must be fully and uniformly applied in all the Member States”).  Amministra-
zione della Finanze del Stato v. Simmenthal SpA (case 106/77) [1978] ECR 
629, 643. 
 6. This statement proves true at least in relation to the contemporary 
English practice of legislative interpretation. 
 7. In the interest of textual simplicity, the phrase “European Court of 
Justice” is used throughout this article to include the “Court of First In-
stance.”   
 8. The Sussex Peerage Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 1034, 1057 (H.L. 1844). 
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those words in their natural and ordinary sense. The words 
themselves alone do, in such a case, best declare the intention 
of the lawgiver. 9 
Admittedly, it is possible, though not usual, to read this 
comment as being an affirmation of literalism as purposivism.  
However, no such equivocation is possible in relation to Lord 
Esher MR’s comment in R v. Judge of the City of London 
Court:10  “If the words of an Act are clear, you must follow them, 
even though they lead to a manifest absurdity.  The court has 
nothing to do with the question whether the legislature has 
committed an absurdity.”11 
The operation of this type of simple literalism may be illus-
trated by the case of Whiteley v. Chappell,12 which arose from 
the statutory offence of impersonating “any person entitled to 
vote” at an election.13  The defendant impersonated someone 
whose name was on the register of electors but who had died 
between the date on which the register had been compiled and 
the date of the election.14  Although he was convicted at first 
instance, his appeal was allowed on the ground that dead men 
are not, in the words of the statute, “entitled to vote.”15  
However, when viewed in its proper historical perspective, 
the nineteenth century flourishing of literalism may be seen as 
a temporary aberration.16  More particularly, in an earlier age, 
when statutes were a relatively minor source of law, the Eng-
lish courts adopted an unashamedly purposive approach to leg-
  
 9. See id. at 1057.  See also In Re Bernard Boaver [1915] 1 K.B. 21, 27. 
 10. Queen v. Judge of the City of London Court [1892] 1 Q.B. 273. 
 11. Id. at 290. 
 12. Whiteley v. Chappell 4 Q.B. 147 (1868). 
 13. See Personation at Election of Guardians of the Poor, 14 & 15 Vict., ch. 
105 §3 (1852) (Eng.).  See also Whiteley, 4 Q.B. at 147. 
 14. Whiteley, 4 Q.B. at 147. 
 15. Id. 
 16. The reasons for this aberration are beyond the scope of this Article, but 
they may be summarized thus.  The combination of the traditional doctrine of 
the legislative supremacy of Parliament and the progressive extension of the 
franchise from the Great Reform Act of 1832 onward, seems to have created a 
mindset on the part of  judges that their role was to do what they were told by 
the supreme and, by the standards of the time, increasingly democratically 
validated Parliament.  Additionally, the background of revolutionary activity 
in continental Europe (especially from 1789 to 1848) can hardly have left the 
judges in any doubt as to the potential consequences of failing to take account 
of the popular will. 
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islative interpretation, as the classic statement in Heydon’s 
Case17 shows: 
For the sure and true interpretation of all statutes...four 
things are to be discerned and considered:  
1st  What was the Common Law before the making of 
the Act?  
2nd What was the mischief and defect for which the 
Common Law did not provide?  
3rd What remedy the Parliament hath resolved and ap-
pointed to cure the disease of the Commonwealth?  
4th The true reason of the remedy; and then the office of 
all the judges is always to make such construction as shall 
suppress the mischief and advance the remedy, and to 
suppress continuance of the mischief...according to the 
true intent of the makers of the Act.18 
In due course, however, for the reasons outlined above,19 this 
approach gave way to literalism, only to re-appear under the 
name of purposivism, in the twentieth century. 
More particularly, the ascendancy of purposivism may be as-
sociated with the period immediately after the Second World 
War, when a great deal of social legislation was enacted.20  It 
may be tentatively suggested that many judges in that context, 
steeped in the democratic tradition, would naturally feel an ob-
ligation to promote the objects of the legislation where it was 
possible to do so.  However, whatever the reasons for the transi-
tion from literalism to purposivism may have been, that there 
was such a transition is abundantly clear.  In the words of Lord 
Diplock, “If one looks back to the actual decisions of this 
House...over the last thirty years one cannot fail to be struck by 
  
 17. Heydon’s Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637, 638 (1584). 
 18. Id. at 638.  It is submitted that the use of the word mischief rather 
than purpose is immaterial. 
 19. See supra text accompanying notes 9–16. 
 20. See, for example, statutes as diverse as the National Health Service 
Act 1946 and the National Parks and Access to the Countryside Act 1949.  
National Health Service Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, ch. 81, National Parks and 
Access to the Countryside Act, 1949, 12, 13 & 14 Geo. 6, ch. 97  For the scope 
of the former, see infra text accompanying note 75.  The scope of the latter is 
reasonably self-evident. 
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the evidence of a trend away from the purely literal towards the 
purposive construction of statutory provisions.”21 
One reason for the resurgence of purposivism appears to be 
the simple, if somewhat belated, realization that the idea of lit-
eral meaning is (or is likely to be) an illusion, as illustrated by 
the case of Bourne v. Norwich Crematorium Ltd.22  The case re-
quired the court to decide whether a crematorium company’s 
expenditure on a furnace chamber and chimney tower qualified 
for a tax allowance.23  The answer to this question depended on 
whether the work was within the definition of “an industrial 
building or structure,” which, in turn, depended on whether the 
chamber and chimney were used “for a trade which consists in 
the manufacture of goods or materials or the subjection of goods 
or material to any process.”24   Stamp J’s intuitive response to 
this question was forthright: 
I would say at once that my mind recoils as much from the de-
scription of the bodies of the dead as “goods or materials” as it 
does from the idea that what is done in a crematorium can be 
described as “the subjection of” the human corpse to a “proc-
ess.”  Nevertheless, the taxpayer so contends and I must ex-
amine that contention.25 
Given the judge’s starting point, it is not altogether surpris-
ing that the taxpayer lost.  For the present purposes, however, 
the most important element of this decision lies in the following 
statement of principle: 
English words derive colour from those which surround them.  
Sentences are not mere collections of words to be taken out of 
the sentence, defined separately by reference to the dictionary 
or decided cases, and then put back again into the sentence 
with the meaning which one has assigned to them as separate 
words so as to give the sentence or phrase a meaning which as 
a sentence or phrase it cannot bear without distortion of the 
English language. That one must construe a word or phrase in 
a section of an Act of Parliament with all the assistance one 
  
 21. Carter v. Bradbeer [1975] 1 W.L.R. 1204, 1208.  The transition was, of 
course, gradual.    
 22. Bourne (Inspector of Taxes) v. Norwich Crematorium Ltd. [1967] 1 
W.L.R. 691, 695. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
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can from decided cases and, if you will, from the dictionary, is 
not in doubt; but having obtained all that assistance, one must 
not at the end of the day distort that which has to be con-
strued and give it a meaning which in its context one would 
not think it can possibly bear.26 
Other reasons for the resurgence of purposivism may include 
an increased awareness that it contributes to, rather than de-
tracts from, the effectiveness of statutory law.27  The following 
cases provide useful examples of the power of purposivism in 
achieving results which could never flow from the application of 
strict literalism.  Moreover, some of them show that the power 
of purposivism may extend even to cases where its application 
will undermine English law’s traditional tendency to err on the 
side of favouring the defence in criminal cases; and, perhaps 
even more startlingly, may defeat property rights expressly con-
ferred by statute.  
Smith v. Hughes28 arose from Section 1 of the Street Offences 
Act 1959, under which it was an offence “to solicit in a street ... 
for the purpose of prostitution.”29  It fell to the High Court to 
decide whether this provision applied where the prostitutes 
were soliciting either from behind windows or on balconies over-
looking the street, while the men who were being solicited were 
in the street.  Since the prostitutes themselves were plainly not 
in the street, it was at least arguable that they should be ac-
quitted.30  However, the court rejected this view, with Lord 
Parker CJ saying, “Everybody knows that this was an Act in-
tended to clean up the streets, to enable people to walk along 
the streets without being molested or solicited by common pros-
  
 26. Id. at 696. 
 27. For example, see the comments of Lord Steyn, which are quoted below 
in the context of interpreting legislation in the light of subsequent scientific 
change in R (on the Application of Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilization and 
Embryology Authority.   R (on the Application of Quintavalle) v. Human Fer-
tilization and Embryology Authority [2002] 1 F.C.R. 664.  
 28. Smith v. Hughes, [1960] 1 W.L.R.. 830; see also Street Offences Act, 
1959, 7 & 8 Eliz. 2, c. 57, § 1(1), (Eng.).  
 29. Street Offences Act, § 1(1). 
 30. On the basis that, as they were not in the street, it followed that they 
could not be convicted of conduct (in this case soliciting) in the street.  Hughes, 
1 W.L.R..at  830. 
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titutes ... For my part, I am content to base my decision on that 
ground and that ground alone.”31 
Other cases may not be characterized by the same level of 
public awareness of the legislative purpose, but this need not 
inhibit the courts from identifying and applying a putative pur-
pose.  For example, in Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith 
Investments Ltd.,32 under Part II of the Landlord and Tenant 
Act 1954, tenants of premises used for business purposes who 
wished to have their expiring tenancies renewed were required 
to ask their landlords to grant them new ones.33  If a landlord 
refused to grant a new tenancy, the tenant then had a statutory 
right to apply to the court, which could order the landlord to 
grant a new tenancy.34  The case required the House of Lords to 
consider the meaning and application of Section 29(3) of the 
Act, which provided that, “no application ... shall be entertained 
unless it is made not less than two nor more than four months 
after...the making of the tenant’s request for a new tenancy.”35  
This may be represented thus: 
 
 
                                      
                                                                         
                                             
                                                                                                
  
 31. Id. at 832.  Lord Parker's confidence that everyone knew the purpose of 
the Act stemmed from the fact that it owed its genesis to the report of the 
Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution, chaired by Sir John 
Wolfenden.  The Wolfenden Report, as it was generally known, had given rise 
to extensive public debate. Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitu-
tion, The Wolfenden Report cmt. 247 (1957). 
 32. Kammins Ballrooms Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Investments (Torquay) Ltd., 
[1970] 3 W.L.R.. 287. 
 33. Id.  Landlord and Tenant Act, 1954, 2 & 3 Eliz. 2, c. 56, § 26, (Eng.). 
 34. Id. at § 24. 
 35. Id. at § 29(3). 
Date of ten-
ant’s request 
for new ten-
ancy. 
First date of 
possible appli-
cation to the 
court. 
Last date 
of possible 
application to 
the court. 
X  ----------  2 months  ----------  Y ----------  2 months ----------  Z 
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In this case, the tenant’s application to the court was plainly 
outside the statutory period.36  Nevertheless, the House of Lords 
held that the statutory provision did not necessarily invalidate 
the application,37 although Lord Diplock did acknowledge that: 
[S]emantics and the rules of syntax alone could never justify 
the conclusion that the words “No application...shall be enter-
tained unless” meant that some applications should be enter-
tained notwithstanding that neither of the conditions which 
follow the word “unless” was fulfilled.38   
The key to Lord Diplock’s reasoning lies in his decision that of 
the purposes of the Landlord and Tenant Act is to encourage 
landlords and tenants to proceed by agreement wherever possi-
ble, together with his view that the time limit in question as 
purely procedural.39  On this basis, it followed that landlords 
should be entitled to waive compliance with the time limit if 
they so wished.  Therefore, in a case where the application to 
the court is made out of time, the first question for the court is 
whether the landlord has, in fact, waived the right to rely on 
observance of the time limits.40   
As we have seen,41 purposivism may even prevail over the 
criminal law’s traditional bias in favour of the defence.  The 
case of R. v. Pigg42 concerned the validity of a rape conviction, 
where the verdict had been by a majority.43   Section 17(3) of the 
Juries Act, 197444 provided that a majority verdict could not be 
accepted unless “the foreman of the jury has stated in open 
  
 36. In fact, it was made approximately half way through the initial two 
month period.  The reason for error appears to have been the tenant’s solici-
tor’s ignorance of the statutory time-scale.  Kammins Ballrooms, 3 W.L.R.. at 
287.   
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. On the facts of the case, the landlord had not waived his right to rely 
on the statutory time limits, but this does not invalidate Lord Diplock’s ap-
proach to the interpretation of the provision.  Id. at 299–300.  
 41. Smith, [1960] 1 W.L.R. at  830. 
 42. R. v. Pigg, [1982] 1 W.L.R.. 6 (Eng.).  
 43. Id. 
 44. After centuries during which a conviction could flow only from a 
unanimous verdict, the possibility of conviction by a majority verdict (of either 
ten or eleven where there were twelve jurors, or nine where there were ten) 
had been introduced by the Criminal Justice Act 1967.  Id.  
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court the number of jurors who respectively agreed to and dis-
sented from the verdict.”45  In this case, when the foreman indi-
cated that ten jurors had agreed to convict, the clerk of the 
court replied “ten agreed to two of you,” to which the foreman 
made no response.46  Although the foreman’s failure to say how 
many jurors had disagreed was a clear contravention of the 
plain words of the statute, Lord Brandon declined to treat this 
failure as being fatal to the resulting conviction:  
If the foreman of the jury states no more than that the number 
agreeing to the verdict is ten, it is nevertheless a necessary 
and inevitable inference, obvious to any ordinary person, that 
the number dissenting from the verdict is two. True it is that 
the foreman of the jury has not said so in terms as the 1974 
Act, interpreted literally, requires. In my opinion, however, it 
is the substance of the requirement...which has to be complied 
with, and the precise form of words by which such compliance 
is achieved, so long as the effect is clear, is not material.47  
The purposive approach, even when it is not expressly la-
belled as such, may even override property rights which have 
been conferred by statute, as illustrated by Re Sigsworth.48  The 
key provision was Section 46 of the Administration of Estates 
Act, 1925, which laid down, in absolute and unqualified terms, 
the order of inheritance in cases where people had died without 
making their wills.49  On the facts of the case, the effect of the 
provision would have been that a murderer would have inher-
ited the estate of his victim.50  Clauson J, in the High Court, 
disapplied the provision, on the basis that, by parity of reason-
ing, the case was governed by the “well-settled principle that 
public policy precludes a sane murderer from taking a benefit 
under a victim’s will.”51  In other words, “the principle…must be 
  
 45. Juries Act, 1974, c. 23, § 17(3), (Eng.). 
 46. Pigg, [1982] 1 W.L.R.. at 6.   
 47. Id. at 12. 
 48. In re Sigsworth, [1935] 1 Ch. 98.; Administration of Estates Act, 1925, 
c. 23, § 46 (Eng.). 
 49. In re Sigsworth, [1935] 1 Ch. at 98.   
 50. Id. 
 51. Id.  The principle, which in relation to testate succession is, of course, 
the basis of the decision in Riggs v. Palmer, is simply one application of a the 
more general principle that there is a presumption that Parliament did not 
intend to all people to gain advantages from their own wrongdoing.  Riggs v. 
Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889).  For another example of this pre-
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so far regarded in the construction of Acts of Parliament that 
general words which might include cases obnoxious to the prin-
ciple must be read and construed as subject to it.”52 
Finally, the courts may use the purposive approach to deal 
with problems which arise from social and scientific changes.  
Two cases — one dealing with social change and one with scien-
tific change — will suffice as examples.   
In Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Association Ltd,53 the 
House of Lords held that, for the purposes of Schedule I to the 
Housing Act, 1977, where a tenant of a dwelling died, leaving a 
same-sex partner with whom he had lived and who wished to 
remain in the dwelling, the survivor was a member of the de-
ceased tenant’s family living with him at the time of his death.54  
The practical consequence of this provision was that the survi-
vor was entitled to inherit both the tenancy and security of ten-
ure.55  As Lord Nicholls put it, when discussing the meaning of 
the word family for the purposes of the statute: 
In the present case Parliament used an ordinary word of flexi-
ble meaning and left it undefined.  The underlying legislative 
purpose was to provide a secure home for those who share 
their lives together with the original tenant in the manner 
which characterizes a family unit.  This purpose would be at 
risk of being stultified if the courts could not have regard to 
changes in the way people live together and changes in the 
perception of relationships.56 
In the context of scientific developments, the decision in R (on 
the Application of Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilisation and Em-
bryology Authority57 is instructive.   The Human Fertilisation 
and Embryology Act, 1990 regulated the creation and use of 
  
sumption in operation, see Re X (A Minor) (Adoption Details: Disclosure), 
[1994] 3 W.L.R. 327, discussed in IAN MCLEOD, LEGAL METHOD 310–11 (4th 
ed., 2002).   
 52. In re Sigsworth, [1935] 1. Ch. 89. 
 53. Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Ass’n Ltd., [1999] 4 All E.R. 705 (H.L. 
1999). 
 54. Id. at 717; Rent Act, 1977, ch. 42 (Eng.). 
 55. Rent Act, sch. 1, para. 3.   
 56. Fitzpatrick, 4 All E.R. at 722.  
 57. Regina (on the application of Quintavalle) v. Human Fertilisation and 
Embryology Authority, [2003] 2 All E.R. 105. 
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human embryos outside the body.58  At the time of enactment, 
fertilisation provided the only means of creating a human em-
bryo.59  Subsequently, scientists developed the technique of clon-
ing by a process known as cell nuclear replacement (“CNR”).60  
The issue in the case was whether the scheme contained in the 
Act applied to embryos created by CNR.61  Holding that there 
was a plain Parliamentary intention that the Act should apply 
to all embryos created outside the human body, irrespective of 
the means of their genesis, Lord Steyn observed: 
In order to give effect to a plain Parliamentary purpose, a 
statute may sometimes be held to cover a scientific develop-
ment not known when the statute was passed.  Given that 
Parliament legislates on the assumption that statutes may be 
in place for many years, and that Parliament wishes to pass 
effective legislation, this is a benign principle designed to 
achieve the wishes of  Parliament.62   
  
 58. See Regina (on the application of Quintavalle) v. Secretary of State for 
Health, [2003] 2 All E.R. 113, 116. 
 59. Accordingly, the word “embryo” was defined for the purposes of the Act, 
and “except where otherwise stated” in terms of fertilization.  See Human 
Fertilisation and Embryology Act, 1990, c. 37, § § 1(1) (Eng.).   
 60. See id.  
CNR is a process by which the nucleus, which is a diploid, from one 
cell is transplanted into an unfertilized egg, from which…the nucleus 
has been removed.  The [replacement] nucleus is derived from either 
an embryonic or a foetal or an adult cell.  The cell is then treated to 
encourage it to grow and divide, forming first a two-cell structure and 
then developing in a similar way to an ordinary embryo.   
CNR is a form of cloning.  Clones are organisms that are genetically 
identical to each other.  When CNR is used, if the embryo develops 
into an live individual, that individual is genetically identical to the 
nucleus transplanted into the egg.  There are other methods of clon-
ing, for example, embryo splitting, which may occur naturally or be 
encouraged.  Identical twins are a result of embryo splitting. 
The famous Dolly the sheep was produced by CNR.  Live young have 
been since produced by CNR in some other mammals.  It has not yet 
been attempted in humans. 
Id. 
 61. Id. at 115. 
 62. Regina v. Human Fertilisation and Embryology Auth., [2002] 2 All E.R. 
625, 722. 
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In this case, therefore, from the point of view of the protection 
afforded to it by the statute, an embryo is an embryo irrespec-
tive of its genesis.  It follows that the courts should not deny 
some embryos the benefit of this statutory protection simply 
because of advances in medical technology occurring after the 
statute was enacted.  
Although the cases discussed above provide clear examples of 
the modern English practice of purposivism, they generally pro-
vide little guidance as to how the legislative purpose is to be 
identified.63 
III.   IDENTIFYING LEGISLATIVE PURPOSES IN ENGLISH LAW  
Having established that purposivism is the predominant 
technique of legislative interpretation in English law, the next 
task is to ascertain the means by which the legislative purpose 
is to be identified.  In common with all other legal systems 
which have emerged and evolved over time, English law con-
tains no single identifiable statement of its own purposes.  Fur-
thermore, one consequence of the informality of the British 
Constitution is that there is similarly no simple and straight-
forward statement of its fundamental, underpinning values.64  
Nevertheless, few would seek to deny that, generally speaking, 
the British Constitution accords high priority to a variety of 
basic values, with obvious examples being the presumptive pro-
tection of the subject’s right of access to justice (an important 
aspect of which is that the jurisdiction of the courts can be 
ousted only by clear words to that effect), and the presumption 
against gaining advantage from wrongdoing.65  Two examples 
  
 63. With the exception Hughes, [1960] 1 W.L.R. at 830. 
 64. Perhaps to some extent making a virtue out of necessity, English com-
mon lawyers often emphasize the pragmatism of the common law.  See, e.g., R. 
v. Higher Education Funding Council ex parte Institute of Dental Surgery, 
[1994] 1 All E.R. 651.  No doubt the common law will develop, as the common 
law does, case by case.  It is not entirely satisfactory that this should be so, 
not least because experience suggests that in the absence of a prior principle 
irreconcilable or inconsistent decisions will emerge.  But from the tenor of the 
decisions principles will come, and if the common law's pragmatism has a 
virtue, it is that these principles are likely to be robust.   Id. at 666 (Sedley J.). 
 65. Values such as these are, of course, common to the Western liberal 
tradition as a whole, and no claim is being advanced here that they are 
uniquely characteristic of the English legal system. 
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(one in relation to each of these values) will suffice for illustra-
tive purposes.  
First, in Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission,66 
the House of Lords held that a statutory provision that deter-
minations of the Foreign Compensation Commission67 “shall not 
be called into question in any court of law”68 did not preclude the 
court from considering a claim that an apparent determination 
was ultra vires and void as a matter of law (and, therefore, 
could not be accurately described as being a determination at 
all).69  In other words, if the legislative purpose includes remov-
ing the subject’s right of access to the courts in order to chal-
lenge the legality of a public body’s decision-making processes, 
Parliament must make that purpose abundantly plain, because 
the courts will be unwilling to presume such a purpose on any 
other basis.  
Secondly, it is worth recalling In Re Sigsworth,70 where the 
court relied on the fundamental principle of the common law 
which prevents gaining advantage from wrongdoing, in order to 
avoid a result which could not have been within the scope of the 
legislative intention.71  
Quite apart from relying on the application of basic principles 
such as those exemplified by the Anisminic and Sigsworth 
cases, the English courts may have recourse to a number of aids 
when seeking to identify legislative intention.  Some of these 
aids are internal to the text in question, while others are exter-
nal.  Taking internal aids first, there is always the possibility 
that a statute will contain an express purpose section.  In prac-
  
 66. Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Commission, [1969] 1 All E.R. 208. 
 67. The Foreign Compensation Commission was established by the Foreign 
Compensation Act 1950 to handle claims for compensation made by British 
subjects against foreign governments.  Foreign Compensation Act, 1950, 14 
Geo. 6, ch. 12, § 4(4) (Eng.).  The scheme was that a foreign government which 
was liable to compensate British subjects would make a lump sum payment to 
the British government, on whose behalf the Foreign Compensation Commis-
sion would entertain claims and decide which were valid and which were inva-
lid, before proceeding to quantify compensation in respect of those which were 
valid.  The present case arose out of compensation due in consequence of the 
Egyptian nationalisation of the Suez canal. 
 68. Foreign Compensation Act, § 4(4). 
 69. Anisminic, 1 All E.R. at 221. 
 70. In re Sigsworth, [1935] 1 Ch. at 98.   
 71. Id. at 89. 
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tice these are very rare, but the Children Act, 1989 and the Ar-
bitration Act, 1996 provide two relatively recent examples of 
provisions which furnish at least some guidance as to how prob-
lems of interpretation should be approached.72 
More useful in practice, because they are universally present, 
are the long titles of statutes, which may provide “the plainest 
of all guides to the general objectives of a statute,” and short 
titles, although it must be remembered that, in the nature of 
short titles, “accuracy may have been sacrificed to brevity.”73  
Reference may also be made to marginal notes.   The classic 
  
 72. §1 of the Children Act 1989 is as follows: 
1.   Welfare of the Child 
(1) When a court determines any question with respect to - 
(a) the upbringing of a child; or 
(b) the administration of a child's property or the applica-
tion of any income arising from it, the child's welfare shall be 
the court's paramount consideration. 
(2) In any proceedings in which any question with respect to the 
upbringing of a child arises, the court shall have regard to the 
general principle that any delay in determining the question is 
likely to prejudice the welfare of the child.' 
Children Act, 1989, c. 41, §1 (Eng.).  §1 of the Arbitration Act 1996 is as fol-
lows: 
1. General Principles 
The provisions of this Part of this Act are founded on the following 
principles, and shall be construed accordingly - 
(a) the object of arbitration is to obtain the fair resolution of dis-
putes by an impartial tribunal without unnecessary delay or ex-
pense; 
(b) the parties should be free to agree how their disputes are re-
solved, subject only to such safeguards as are necessary in the 
public interest; 
(c) in matters governed by this Part the court should not inter-
vene except as provided by this Part. 
Arbitration Act, 1996, c. 23, § 1 (Eng.) 
 73. Scrutton LJ, In re Boaler, 1 K.B. at 21.  For an example of a short title 
and a long title (reversing the order in which they appear in the text to this 
note), see the National Health Service Act 1946 which is an Act to provide for 
the establishment of a comprehensive health service for England and Wales 
and for purposes connected herewith.  Boaler, [1915] 1 K.B. 21 (Scrutton, LJ); 
National Health Services Act, 1946, 9 & 10 Geo. 6, c. 81 (Eng.). 
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example is Stephens v. Cuckfield Rural District Council,74 where 
the council served a notice requiring a landowner to tidy up a 
site which was seriously injurious to the amenity of the dis-
trict.75  The statutory power76 was exercisable only in respect of 
“a garden, vacant site or other open space.”77  The question for 
the court was whether the power was exercisable in respect of a 
car-breaker’s yard.78  While the site was clearly an “open space” 
(in the sense that it was uncovered), the court nevertheless de-
cided that the statutory power was not exercisable.  One thread 
in the reasoning leading to this conclusion was that the mar-
ginal note to the section referred to “power to require proper 
maintenance of waste land etc,” and it was clear beyond doubt 
that the site in question did not fall within this category.79  Re-
ferring to the marginal note and its relevance to the process of 
interpretation, Upjohn LJ said, “While the marginal note to a 
section cannot control the language used in the section, it is at 
least permissible to approach a consideration of its general pur-
pose and the mischief at which it is aimed with the note in 
mind.”80 
Going beyond the confines of the statute itself, material may 
be conveniently divided into three categories (namely, pre-
Parliamentary, Parliamentary and post-Parliamentary) in or-
der to assess the extent to which material within each category 
may be used in order to identify the legislative purpose.  Pre-
Parliamentary, such as reports of official committees and Royal 
Commissions, are generally accepted as being relevant when 
seeking to establish the purpose — but not the meaning — of 
ensuing legislation.81  Parliamentary materials82 may normally 
  
 74. Stephens v. Cuckfield Rural District Council, [1960] 2 Q.B. 373. 
 75. Id. at 376. 
 76. Town and Country Planning Act, 1947, 10 & 11 Geo. 6, c. 51, § 33 (1). 
 77. See Cuckfield Rural District Council, [1960] 2 Q.B. at 373.  See also 
Town and Country Planning Act § 33. 
 78. Cuckfield Rural District Council, [1960] 2 Q.B. at 374.  
 79. Id. at 378–79. 
 80. Id. 
 81. R. v. Allen, [1985] 2 All E.R. 641.  For an example of the use of pre-
Parliamentary materials in order to identify the legislative purpose, see 
Hughes, 2 All E.R. at 859 (relying on the Wolfenden Report).  
 82. In practice, the phrase Parliamentary materials almost invariably 
means the official record of Parliamentary business (including verbatim re-
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be used for the purposes of statutory interpretation in only very 
limited circumstances, namely  
where (a) legislation is ambiguous or obscure, or leads to an 
absurdity; (b) the material relied upon consists of one or more 
statements by a minister or other promoter of the Bill to-
gether, if necessary with such other Parliamentary material as 
is necessary to understand such statements and their effect; 
(c) the statements relied upon are clear.83 
Taking these elements in turn, there will be many cases in 
which the requirement of ambiguity or obscurity either indubi-
tably exists or, at least, can be made to appear to exist by a 
skilled advocate.  Having thus established a very broad crite-
rion, the House immediately proceeded to limit the scope of the 
new doctrine by restricting the use of Parliamentary materials 
to statements made by whoever introduced the Bill which be-
came the Act which falls to be interpreted.84  The third require-
ment (namely, that the statements should be clear) may seem 
sensible enough, but once again, the ingenuity of the advocate 
may well be enough to introduce sufficient doubt to exclude re-
liance on any particular statement.   
In addition to the general rule expressed above, there is one 
further rule of much more limited scope: when interpreting leg-
islation which has been passed to implement a Community law 
obligation, reference may be made to Parliamentary materials 
in order to identify the extent of that obligation.85  The most ob-
vious example of this would be where legislation is enacted to 
implement a Directive,86 but the principle applies equally to all 
forms of Community legislation.87 
  
ports of debates in both the House of  Commons and the House of Lords) 
which are published in Hansard. 
 83. See Pepper v. Hart, [1993] 1 All ER 42, 69 (Lord Browne-Wilkinson, 
concurring with five of the other six Law Lords; Lord Mackay LC, dissenting). 
 84. In practice, almost all Bills are government Bills and, therefore, the 
person to whose statements the court may refer will almost invariably be a 
government minister.  
 85. Pickstone v. Freemans PLC [1988] 3 C.M.L.R. 221, 238–44 (Lord 
Oliver’s opinion).  
 86. Directives require member states to achieve defined objectives while 
leaving it to each member state to identify and adopt whatever mechanism it 
considers to be appropriate to achieve the objective in question, within the 
context of its own legal system.  See Treaty Establishing the European Eco-
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Having discussed the origin, evolution, nature and power of 
purposivism in the English common law, it is now appropriate 
to turn to its position in European Community law. 
IV.  LITERAL AND PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN EUROPEAN 
COMMUNITY LAW 
The idea of literalism has never been central to the civil law88 
tradition in which Community law is rooted.  Moreover, and 
perhaps more importantly, literalism is intrinsically unlikely to 
play a significant part in a multi-lingual system in which all 
languages (nine, in the case of the Community) are equally au-
thentic.  Overall, therefore, it is hardly surprising that, as the 
following discussion will show, the European Court of Justice 
attaches much greater importance to factors such as the overall 
legislative scheme and its purposes than it does to the idea of 
the literal meaning of the words used to convey that scheme 
and those purposes.  
In Wendelboe v. LJ Music,89 the European Court of Justice 
had to interpret Article 3(1) of the Transfer of Undertakings 
Directive, which the Court abbreviated as, “[T]he transferor’s 
rights and obligations arising from a contract of employment or 
from an employment relationship existing at the date of a 
transfer…shall, by reason of such transfer, be transferred to the 
transferee.”90  The question was whether it was the contract of 
employment or the obligations which had to be existing at the 
date of the transfer.  In the English and Danish versions of the 
text, either conclusion was possible, but the Dutch, French, 
German, Greek and Italian versions were open to only one lit-
eral interpretation, namely that it was the contract of employ-
ment (or employment relationship) which had to be in existence 
at the date of the transfer.  In other words, having read all the 
official language versions, it was impossible to conclude that 
there was a single, literal meaning. 
  
nomic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, Art. 249, 298 U.N.T.S. 36 (i.e. Treaty of 
Rome 1957).  
 87. For example, in Pickstone, the English legislation had been triggered 
by a regulation.  See Pickstone, [1988] 2 All E.R. at 803.  
 88. Using the term “civil law” to mean “Roman law based.” 
 89. Wendelboe v. L.J. Music APS, [1985] E.C.R. 457 (Eng.). 
 90. Id. at 466. 
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Although the version contained in the majority languages 
prevailed in this case, there is no principle which requires that 
this shall be so in all cases.  For example, in Elefanten Schuh v. 
Jacqmain,91 the European Court of Justice had to interpret Ar-
ticle 18 of the European Community Convention on Jurisdiction 
and the Enforcement of Judgments 1968.92  The problem arose 
from a discrepancy between the French and Irish texts on the 
one hand and the English, Danish, Dutch, German and Italian 
texts on the other.93  More particularly, the English text repre-
senting the majority, provided that “a court of a Contracting 
State before whom a defendant enters an appearance shall have 
jurisdiction.  This rule shall not apply where appearance was 
entered solely to contest the jurisdiction.”94  Assuming that the 
word “solely” means something, the effect of this version is that 
defendants who wish to contest both the jurisdiction of the court 
and (if they lose the jurisdiction argument) the merits of the 
case, must be taken as having submitted to the jurisdiction of 
the court.95  The European Court of Justice upheld the French 
and Irish versions (neither of which contained anything equiva-
lent to the word “solely”) on the basis that these were “more in 
keeping with the objectives and spirit of the Convention” than 
were the alternative language versions.96    
Of course, the lack of status which Community law accords to 
the literal technique leaves open the question of which other 
technique (or techniques) should be adopted.  There is no uni-
versally agreed terminology for describing those techniques, but 
the two concepts which are involved are sometimes labelled con-
textual or schematic and teleological.97  Advocate-General May-
  
 91. Elefanten Schuh v. Jacqmain, [1981] E.C.R. 1671 (Eng.). 
 92. The European Community Convention on Jurisdiction and the En-
forcement of Judgments 1968 is commonly known as the Brussels Convention. 
 93. Jacqmain, [1981] E.C.R. at 1671.  
 94. Id. (citing Article 18 of the Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 27, 1968, 
1978 O.J. (L 304) 36).   
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 1685.   
 97. Rules of Interpretation of ECC Laws [1989] STAT LR 163, 168–73 
(where Millett uses “schematic” and “teleological”).  See generally STEPHEN 
WEATHERILL & PAUL BEAUMONT, EC LAW (3d ed. 1999) (where the authors use 
“contextual” and “schematic”).  
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ras brought the whole topic into sharp focus when he said that 
the principal aim of the court was to identify the clear meaning: 
[T]his Court may not substitute its discretion for that of the 
Community legislature; when the meaning of the legislation is 
clear it has to be applied with that meaning, even if the solu-
tion prescribed may be thought to be unsatisfactory.  That is 
not to say, however, that the literal construction of a provision 
must always be accepted.  If such construction were to lead to 
a nonsensical result in regard to a situation which the Court 
believed the provision was intended to cover, certain doubts 
might properly be entertained in regard to it.  In other words, 
the clear meaning and the literal meaning are not synony-
mous. There have been many cases in which the Court has re-
jected a literal interpretation in favour of another which it 
found more compatible with the objective and the whole scheme 
of the legislation in question.98  
As Advocate-General Mayras acknowledged, both the objec-
tive (or purpose) and the scheme of the legislation have to be 
considered.99  In practice, these two factors are commonly so 
closely inter-twined or overlapping as to amount to one single, 
contextual factor.100 
One of the earliest and most important examples of schematic 
(or teleological) interpretation may be found in van Gend en 
Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen,101 where a 
Dutch company was aggrieved by a contravention of Article 12 
(now Article 25) of the Community Treaty, which prohibits 
member states from “introducing between themselves any new 
  
 98. Fellinger v. Bundesanstalt für Arbeit, [1980] 1 E.C.R. 535, 550 (em-
phasis added). 
 99. Id. at 550. 
 100. Indeed, it is difficult to see any point in making the distinction in the 
first place, since at least part of the purpose of any piece of Community legis-
lation must be to advance either the scheme of Community law as a whole or 
some identifiable part thereof.  It is difficult, therefore, to disagree with Lord 
Mackenzie Stuart, the United Kingdom’s first judge in the European Court of 
Justice, who once commented that he wished to add nothing to the discussion 
of the nature of the interpretations “except a note of scepticism and the sug-
gestion there are dangers in over-analysis.”  See LORD MACKENZIE STUART, 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES AND THE RULE OF LAW 72 (1977).  For further 
comment on identifying the legislative purpose of Community legislation, see 
Case 26/62, Van gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 
1963 E.C.R. 1. 
 101. Van gend en Loos, 1963 E.C.R. at 1.  
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customs duties….”102  For the present purposes, the question 
was whether the company could enforce the article against the 
Dutch customs authorities in the Dutch courts.103  The European 
Court of Justice said:  
The very nature of this prohibition makes it ideally adapted to 
produce direct effects in the legal relationship between the 
member states and their subjects  
... 
It follows...that, according to the spirit, the general scheme 
and the wording of the Treaty, article 12 must be interpreted 
as producing direct effects and creating individual rights 
which national courts must protect.104   
In other words, the whole scheme, and therefore an identifi-
able purpose, of Community law contributed to the requirement 
of an affirmative answer to the question raised by the company; 
and this answer was also supported by the wording of the rele-
vant article. 
However, in some cases the other factors may well operate to 
negative the literal meaning.  For example, in Commission v. 
Netherlands,105 the issue was whether butter which was being 
stored in Dutch customs warehouses (and which formed part of 
the Community’s so-called butter mountain) could lawfully be 
re-packed into smaller quantities.106  In response to the Dutch 
argument that this was a well-established national practice, the 
European Court of Justice said: 
The…argument which seeks to establish that the contested 
packing is one of the forms of handling specified in article 1(1) 
of Directive 71/235, inasmuch as it was traditionally author-
ized in Netherlands customs warehouses, cannot be accepted.  
Although the inventory of national practices was carried out at 
an early stage in the preparatory work for the Directive, its 
purpose was not to maintain them but, on the contrary, to 
harmonize them. 
…. 
  
 102. Id. at 4. 
 103. Id. at 3. 
 104. Id. at 12. 
 105. Commission v. Kingdom of the Netherlands, [1983] 1 E.C.R. 1195. 
 106. Id. at 1196. 
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In the Court’s opinion, the question whether or not the con-
tested packing comes within the scope of the customs ware-
housing procedure laid down by Directive 71/235 cannot be de-
cided by reference to the [text]; instead, the operation must be 
considered in the light of the objective of the customs warehous-
ing procedure.107   
Between the extremes of confirming and negating the literal 
meaning, there lies the possibility of using the schematic tech-
nique to fill in the gaps, a classic example of which is Commis-
sion v. United Kingdom.108  The United Kingdom had introduced 
the Road Vehicles Lighting Regulations, 1984.109  These Regula-
tions required motor vehicles to be fitted with a dim-dip device, 
which would produce an intensity of beam below that of ordi-
nary dipped headlamps whenever a vehicle’s ignition was 
switched on.110  The Commission claimed that these Regulations 
infringed Council Directive 76/756/EEC on the approximation of 
the laws of the member states relating to the installation of 
lighting and light-signalling devices on motor vehicles and their 
trailers.111  The United Kingdom responded that the Directive 
was non-exhaustive and merely prohibited refusal of type-
approval for vehicles on grounds relating to the lighting and 
light-signalling devices listed in an Annex to the Directive.112  
Since dim-dip devices were not within the scope of the Annex, 
the United Kingdom argued that it followed that there was no 
infringement of the Directive.113  The European Court of Justice, 
however, took the view that the purpose of the Directive was to 
promote freedom of trade in motor vehicles across the Commu-
nity, and that unique requirements of the type imposed by the 
United Kingdom in this case were incompatible with that pur-
pose.114  
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that Community Law 
acknowledges literal meaning as only one element in the matrix 
  
 107. Id. at 1205 (emphasis added).  
 108. Commission v. United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, 
[1988] 7 E.C.R. 3921. 
 109. Road Vehicles Lighting Regulations, S.I.  812 (1984).  
 110. Commission v. United Kingdom, 7 E.C.R. at 3932. 
 111. Id. at 3924–25. 
 112. Id. at 3926. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 3935. 
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of considerations by reference to which the legal meaning of a 
legislative instrument is to be identified, with the purpose of 
the legislative scheme being a further (and, in practice, more 
important) element within that matrix.  What must now be con-
sidered is how legislative purposes are to be identified within 
Community Law. 
V.  IDENTIFYING LEGISLATIVE PURPOSES IN COMMUNITY LAW 
The discussion of interpretation in the European Court has 
been able to proceed thus far on the basis of Community law as 
an all-embracing term, with legislative interpretation being 
given a correspondingly all-embracing meaning.  However, 
when proceeding to discuss the identification of legislative pur-
poses it is necessary, for some purposes, to distinguish between 
Community treaties and Community legislation, according to 
which usage legislation has the narrower meaning of regula-
tions, directives and decisions.115  
Proceeding to the substance of the discussion, it is useful to 
emphasize the contrast between the synthetic (or constructed) 
nature of the Community’s legal system and the natural (or 
spontaneous) character of domestic legal systems.  One impor-
tant aspect of this is that the whole Community, including its 
legal system, is based on expressly articulated objectives (or 
purposes).116  For example, and to begin at the beginning, the 
preamble to the Community Treaty identifies a number of social 
and economic ideals as the foundation for achieving “an ever 
closer union among the peoples of Europe.”117   
In addition to these general statements of the purposes of the 
system of Community law as a whole, individual pieces of legis-
lation (that is to say, regulations, directives and decisions) will 
each have their own purposes.  The general proposition is, un-
surprisingly, that Community legislation should be interpreted, 
so far as possible, in ways which make it consistent with the 
  
 115. See Lord Slynn of Hadley, Looking at European Community Texts, 
STAT. L.R. 12, 13 (1993). 
 116. As has already been noted supra Part II, second paragraph, this is in 
marked contrast to domestic legal systems.  See accompanying text and supra 
note 16.  
 117. Consolidated Version Of The Treaty Establishing The European Com-
munity, Dec. 24, 2002, O.J. (C 324) 33, 39 (2002).  Article 2 of the Treaty sets 
out the task of the Community in broadly similar terms.  Id. at 40.    
File: McLeod5.25.03.doc Created on: 5/25/2004 8:11 PM Last Printed: 6/25/2004 2:35 PM 
2004] LITERAL AND PURPOSIVE TECHNIQUES 1131 
Treaties and the general principles of Community law.118  More 
specifically, the operative part of each piece of Community legis-
lation will be preceded by citations and recitals. 
Citations consist of a number of short paragraphs, each of 
which begins with the words “having regard to.”119  Citations 
will typically identify the relevant treaty article(s) and any 
relevant proposals, opinions and consultations in which the leg-
islation in question purports to locate its legal base.  Clearly, 
therefore, while citations are important in those cases where an 
issue arises as to the legitimacy or illegitimacy of legislation, 
they also serve the purpose of identifying the legislative pur-
pose as an aid to interpretation, which is a skill much more 
commonly required in legal practice. 
Recitals consist of a number of paragraphs that are generally 
rather longer than those constituting citations, each of which 
begins with the word “whereas.”120  Recitals set out the reasons 
underlying the legislation and may, therefore, be very helpful in 
identifying the legislative purpose(s). 
Going outside the text of the treaties, the travaux prépara-
toires may be used for the purposes of interpretation, provided 
it is remembered that “any argument… which is not based on 
the Treaty itself cannot be decisive.”121  However, such aids, and 
therefore their limited assistance, will not always be available.  
In such cases, “in the absence of working documents clearly ex-
pressing the intention of the draftsmen of a provision, the Court 
can base itself only on the scope of the wording as it is.”122 
Travaux préparatoires are also relevant to the interpretation 
of Community legislation.  For example, in Stauder v. City of 
Ulm,123 the Court noted that a recital to a decision showed an 
intention to adopt an amendment to the decision which had 
been proposed when an earlier draft was being considered.124  
  
 118. Klensch v. Secretaire d’Etata a l’Agriculture et a la Viticulture, [1986] 
10 E.C.R. 3477; Rauh v. Hauptzollamt Nurnberg-Furth, [1991] 3 E.C.R. 1647. 
 119. See, e.g., Commission Regulation 282/2004, 2004 J.O. (L 49) 11; Com-
mission Regulation 283/2004, 2004 J.O. (L 49) 25. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Case 362, Commission v. Luxembourg and Belgium, 1964 E.C.R. 625 
(opinion of A-G Roemer).   
 122. Simon v. Court of Justice, 1961 E.C.R. 115. 
 123. Stauder v. City of Ulm, Sozialamt, Case 29/69, [1969] E.C.R. 419. 
 124. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
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Similarly, the Court of Justice has held that letters sent by the 
High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community to 
the addressee of a decision, were available as aids to the inter-
pretation of the decision itself.125  On the other hand, 
“[s]ubsequent statements originating from officials of the High 
Authority cannot have any influence on the interpretation of 
decisions made by the latter, at least when such interpretation, 
irrespective of the statements made, leads to a logical result.”126 
The cases identified and discussed above lead to the conclu-
sion that Community law contains a more developed body of 
authority as to the identification of legislative purposes than 
does English common law.  Perhaps, however, this is less than 
altogether surprising, bearing in mind the teleological tradition 
of interpretation in which Community law is rooted. 
VI.  THE USE OF COMMUNITY TECHNIQUES OF INTERPRETATION 
IN ENGLISH COURTS 
As we have seen, at an early stage in the United Kingdom’s 
membership of the Community Lord Denning MR accepted the 
need for English courts to employ the Community law method 
when interpreting Community legislation.127  The point was fur-
ther emphasized in Henn & Darby v. Director of Public Prosecu-
tions,128 where the issue was whether an English prohibition on 
the importation of obscene articles129 was contrary to Article 30 
of the Treaty of Rome, 1957 which prohibited quantitative re-
strictions on imports from between member state.130  Respond-
ing to a preliminary reference from the House of Lords, the 
European Court of Justice said it was well established in Com-
munity law, that a total prohibition is a quantitative restriction 
for the present purposes.  When the case returned to the House 
of Lords, Lord Diplock said: 
In the Court of Appeal considerable doubt was expressed by 
that court as to whether an absolute prohibition on the import 
  
 125. Societa Industriale Acciaiere San Michele v. High Authority of the 
European Coal and Steel Community, [1964] C.M.L.R. 146 (1964).  
 126. Lemmerz-Werke GmbH v. High Authority, [1964] C.M.L.R 384.  
 127. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.  
 128. Henn & Darby v. Director of Public Prosecutions, [1981] A.C. 850.   
 129. See Customs Consolidations Act, 1876, c. 36, § 42 (Eng.). 
 130. Treaty of Rome, 1957, c. 2, art. 30. 
File: McLeod5.25.03.doc Created on: 5/25/2004 8:11 PM Last Printed: 6/25/2004 2:35 PM 
2004] LITERAL AND PURPOSIVE TECHNIQUES 1133 
of a particular description of goods could amount to a quanti-
tative restriction or a measure having equivalent effect, so as 
to fall within the ambit of art. 30 at all.  That such doubt 
should be expressed shows the danger of an English court ap-
plying English canons of statutory construction to the inter-
pretation of the Treaty or, for that matter, of Regulations or 
Directives.131 
From the Community perspective, the requirement of the 
adoption of shared techniques is not only a means of maximis-
ing the coherence of Community law as a whole,132 but is also an 
aspect of the doctrine which received one formulation in von 
Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen,133 before being re-inforced 
in Marleasing SA v. La Comercial Internacional de Ali-
mentación SA.134  In von Colson the European Court of Justice 
said: 
In applying the national law and in particular the provision of 
a national law specifically introduced in order to implement [a 
Directive], national courts are required to interpret their na-
tional law in the light of the wording and the purpose of the 
Directive in order to achieve the result referred to in [the 
Treaty].135  
Although this statement emphasizes the position in relation 
to provisions specifically introduced to implement Community 
obligations, when read as a whole it is reasonably clear that it 
is intended to apply equally to all national provisions.  Any 
doubt in this respect was laid to rest in Marleasing, which 
obliges national courts to interpret national law in accordance 
with Community law wherever this is possible, even if no na-
tional legislation has been enacted specifically to comply with 
Community law.136  This includes the situation in which the 
relevant national law consists of prior legislation, which plainly 
cannot have been enacted to comply with a provision of Com-
munity law which did not exist at the time of its enactment.  
  
 131. See Henn & Darby, [1981] A.C. at 904. 
 132. See Simmenthal SpA, [1978] E.C.R. 629, 643.  
 133. Case 14/83, Colson v. Land Nordrhein-Westfalen, [1984] E.C.R. 1891, 2 
C.M.L.R. 430 (1984). 
 134. Case C-106/89, Marleasing S.A. v. La Comercial Internacional de Ali-
mentación S.A., 1990 E.C.R. I-4135, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 305 (1992). 
 135. Id. at 430 (emphasis added).   
 136. Marleasing, [1992] 1 C.M.L.R. 305, 307. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
Both the English common law and Community law approach 
the task of legislative interpretation in a purposive, or teleologi-
cal, way.  However, there is a significant difference between the 
two systems, in that lawyers operating within the Community 
legal system may refer to explicitly articulated statements of 
legislative purpose.  By way of contrast, while the English legal 
system provides some aids to identifying legislative purposes, 
those purposes are almost always less explicitly identified.  It 
follows both that the identification of legislative purposes is 
more difficult in English than in Community law, and that it is 
more difficult to be confident of the accuracy of any identifica-
tion which is made.   
Finally, and at the risk of stating the obvious, it may be 
worth commenting that, as the quantity of litigation coming 
before the Court of Justice demonstrates, the ability to identify 
legislative purposes both more simply and more accurately than 
is usually possible in the English legal system, does not neces-
sarily guarantee that disputes will be resolved without recourse 
to the courts. 
 
